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Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a comprehensive regional trade
agreement between Mexico, the United States and Canada (Compa 6). President George H. W.
Bush signed NAFTA in December 1992, but it was President Clinton who sent NAFTA to the
Senate for ratification in 1993 (“Trading Away Rights” 1). On January 1, 1994, NAFTA and the
labor side accord, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, came into effect
(Caulfield 66). Although signed into law 23 years ago, this piece of legislation remains
controversial. In the most recent presidential election between Republican Donald Trump and
Democrat Hillary Clinton, NAFTA was a hot button issue and a point of great contention.
Throughout the 2016 presidential debates, Donald Trump consistently emphasized the
unfairness of NAFTA to workers in the United States. Trump stated on his campaign website:
Tell NAFTA partners that we intend to immediately renegotiate the terms of that
agreement to get a better deal for our workers. If they don’t agree to a renegotiation, we
will submit notice that the U.S. intends to withdraw from the deal. Eliminate Mexico’s
one-side backdoor tariff through the VAT and end sweatshops in Mexico that undercut
U.S. workers (“Donald J. Trump’s Vision”)
This statement encapsulates the view that many US politicians and citizens have about trade
agreements: they are purely business deals. But, the essence of NAFTA offers more than just
business incentives for member countries, it also provides for the enforcement of labor standards:
a revolutionary concept in the realm of free trade agreements. NAFTA actually has a side accord,
which was negotiated at the same time as NAFTA and the North American Agreement on
Environment Cooperation accord, known as the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC) (Compa 6-7). The NAALC is a labor agreement, which calls on the

signatories to “enforce their domestic labor standards effectively while working cooperatively
with the International Labor Organization (ILO)” (McGuinness 6). It was adopted in 1993 to
“work toward broad improvements in the situation of labor rights in their respective countries”
(“Trading Away Rights” 1). While an honorable mission, this mission is hardly discussed by the
American public.
Although there is much public discourse in the United States on the subject of NAFTA’s
economic ramifications, few people discuss the NAALC, which is also important. In the
following sections of my paper, I aim to show that the side agreement to NAFTA, known as the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAACL), does not give adequate protection
to laborers in Mexico. To demonstrate this I will: provide background information on NAFTA
and the NAALC, demonstrate the faults in the NAALC, analyze two cases that went through the
remedy process laid out in the NAALC, and finally provide recommendations on how this piece
of legislation can be improved.
Background
In this section, I will provide some background on NAFTA and NAALC. This background is
necessary to understand the chapters that follow.
What is NAFTA?
NAFTA is a comprehensive regional trade agreement between Mexico, the United States,
and Canada. In essence, “NAFTA provides for the phased elimination of tariff and most nontariff
barriers on regional trade within 10 years” (Hufbauer and Schott 2). NAFTA also “extends the
innovative dispute settlement procedures of the FTA to Mexico…; contains precedent-setting
rights and obligations regarding services and investment; and takes an important first step in
addressing cross-border environmental issues”( Hufbauer and Schott 2). The Free Trade

Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the United States was agreed to in 1988, so essentially
NAFTA is an expansion of this initial agreement to include Mexico (Hufbauer and Schott 2).
The book, NAFTA: An Assesment, by Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J Schott, discusses the
promising features of the agreement. The authors highlight four major features of NAFTA. They
write:
First, the NAFTA establishes within 15 years free trade in agricultural products between
the United States and Mexico. The accord immediately converts key US and Mexican
agricultural restrictions into tariff-rate quotas and sets a maximum 15-year period for the
phase-out of the over-quota tariffs–an impressive achievement considering the dismal
track record of other trade talks in reducing long-standing farm trade barriers. Second, the
investment obligations of the NAFTA accord national treatment to NAFTA investors,
remove most performance requirements on investment in the region, and open up new
investment opportunities in key Mexican sectors such as petrochemical and financial
services…. Third, the pact sets important precedents for the future regional and
multilateral negotiations by substantially opening the financial services market in Mexico
to US and Canadian participants by the year 2000 and by removing significant obstacles
to land transportation and telecommunication services. Finally, the NAFTA offers a
schizophrenic result in textiles and apparel. On the one hand, the pact calls for the
elimination of all tariffs and quotas on regional trade in textiles and apparel. This is the
first time in this heavily protected sector that imports from an important developingcountry supplier have been significantly liberalized by the United States and Canada
(Hufbauer and Schott 2-3)

NAFTA is the first of its kind type, and it set the precedent for the other trade agreements that
have followed. But, while the NAFTA agreement deals specifically with free trade, the labor side
accord, the NAALC set about labor provisions that the member countries must adhere to. This
brings me to the question of have the labor standards been complied with? After 23 years, we are
now in a position to address this question. For this paper, we will examine the effects the
NAALC on the rights and wages of the laborers who work in Mexico.
The Groundwork for NAALC
While NAFTA was a groundbreaking trade agreement that encompassed many, neverbefore-seen components to a trade agreement, NAFTA left out human rights assurances for
laborers (Compa 6). Since NAFTA has no provisions on labor rights, politicians and citizens in
the United States, Mexico, and Canada began to voice their concerns about the trade agreement
even before it was ratified (Compa 6). For example, during his Presidential run in 1992, Bill
Clinton stated that NAFTA “did nothing to reaffirm our right to insist that the Mexicans follow
their own labor standards, now frequently violated” (Human Rights Watch 1). These publicly
expressed concerns ultimately led to the decision to create the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation (Compa 6).
In the United States, many lawmakers expressed that they would refuse to approve the
congressional-executive agreement unless labor norms were somehow incorporated into the free
trade agreement (McGuinness 582). A major reason there was so much support for creating a
way to implement labor standards was because there was much fear that industries in the United
States and Canada would simply go to Mexico to exploit “lower production costs and the weak
labor and occupational health regulatory structure” (McGuinness 580). The idea that American
and Canadian citizens would lose jobs and Mexican workers may be subjugated to harsh, unfair

working conditions created a push to ensure that the laborers in all member countries would be in
no way harmed by the effects of NAFTA. In essence, the NAALC was a mechanism to alleviate
concerns about NAFTA’s potential consequences (McGuinness 582).
Although the NAALC had the intentions of preserving labor rights and enforcing
domestic laws, we must question whether or not this set-up actually worked. Did the NAALC
truly make it so corporations could not exploit labor in Mexico? With the constant outrage in the
US of jobs going to Mexico, it seems that the NAALC has failed. We will continue to explore
the notion of potential failure in the next sections of this paper.
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
In this section of the paper, I will explain what the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation actually is and how it functions.
The Purpose
The main purpose of the NAALC is to have member countries enforce their domestic
labor standards (Caulfield 66). “The NAALC is supposed to provide ‘a mechanism for member
countries to ensure the effective enforcement of existing and future domestic labor standards and
laws without interfering in the sovereign functioning of the different national labor standards’”
(Caulfield 66). The official text states that the main objective is:
[T]o improve working conditions and living standards in the United States, Mexico, and
Canada as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) promotes more trade
and closer economic ties among the three countries. The preferred approach of the
Agreement to reach this objective is through cooperation--exchanges of information,
technical assistance, consultations--a concept that is explicitly recognized in the very title
of the instrument. The Agreement also provides some oversight mechanisms to ensure

that labor laws are being enforced in all three countries. These oversight mechanisms are
aimed at promoting a better understanding by the public of labor laws and at enhancing
transparency of enforcement. The Agreement does provide the ability to invoke trade
sanctions as a last resort for non-enforcement of labor law by a Party (“North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation”)
Essentially, the agreement has two main goals: “(1) to encourage the improvement of labor
conditions in North America through cooperative activities, including the promotion of a set of
eleven labor principles… and (2) to provide a mechanism for mediating labor disputes”
(Caulfield 66). These broad goals are said to be the key reasons the accord was ratified.
The Function
In order to understand what the NAALC does, it is important to note what the NAALC
does not do: “The NAALC does not require the governments of the three signatory countries to
raise standards to meet existing minimum international labor standards” (Caulfield 66). This
means that the NAALC does not create any new type of law or regulation. Now that I have
explained what the NAALC does not do, I will explain what it does establish.
The agreement states that all member countries will follow six objectives (“The North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). These objectives are:
a) improve working conditions and living standards in each Party's territory;
b) promote, to the maximum extent possible, the labor principles set out in Annex 11;
c) encourage cooperation to promote innovation and rising levels of productivity and
quality;

1 Annex 1: 1) Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, 2) The right to bargain collectively, 3) The right to
strike, 4) Prohibition of forced labor, 5) Labor protections for children and young persons, 6)Minimum employment
standards, 7)Elimination of employment discrimination, 8) Equal pay for women and men, 9) Prevention of occupational
injuries and illness, 10) Compensation in cases of occupational injury and illnesses, 11) Protection of migrant workers
(Compa 1997)

d) encourage publication and exchange of information, data development and coordination,
and joint studies to enhance mutually beneficial understanding of the laws and
institutions governing labor in each Party's territory;
e) pursue cooperative labor-related activities on the basis of mutual benefit;
f) promote compliance with, and effective enforcement by each Party of, its labor law; and
g) foster transparency in the administration of labor law. (“The North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation”)
These six standards are followed by six ways in which the governments can implement the
standards. This is covered in the “Government Action Section” (“The North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). The Government Enforcement Action section states:
1. Each Party shall promote compliance with and effectively enforce its labor law
through appropriate government action, subject to Article 42, such as
a. appointing and training inspectors;
b. monitoring compliance and investigating suspected violations, including through
on-site inspections;
c. seeking assurances of voluntary compliance;
d. requiring record keeping and reporting
e. encouraging the establishment of worker-management committees to address
labor regulation of the workplace;
f. providing or encouraging mediation, conciliation and arbitration services; or
g. initiating, in a timely manner, proceedings to seek appropriate sanction or
remedies for violations of its labor law.

2. Each Party shall ensure that its competent authorities give due consideration in
accordance with its law to any request by an employer, employee or their
representatives, or other interested person, for an investigation of an alleged violation
of the Party's labor law. (“The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”)
These ideals are supposed to be enforced through a body created by the NAALC that is known as
the Commission for Labor Cooperation (Caulfield 66). It is critical to remember that:
While the countries have not yielded sovereignty with respect to the content of their laws
or the authorities and procedure for enforcing them, they have transcended traditional
notions of sovereignty by opening themselves to critical international and independent
reviews, evaluations and even arbitrations over their performance in enforcing labor laws
(Compa 7)
It is also important to note that only three out of the eleven issue areas that were covered in
Appendix 1 carry any kind of potential fine or loss in accordance with the NAALC (Compa 7).
The areas are: minimum wage, child labor, and occupational health and safety (Compa 7).
Moreover, the fine or loss can only occur if there is a “persistent pattern of failure to effectively
enforce domestic law (Compa 7). Again, the eleven labor standards are defined as “guiding
principles” and they in no way “establish common minimum standards for their [the member
countries] domestic law” (“ The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”).
Enforcement Mechanisms
The NAALC aims to ensure each country is complying with and enforcing their labor
laws without yielding sovereignty (Compa 7). So, how exactly does the NAALC go about
ensuring this objective? The NAALC “establishes a tri-national dispute resolution scheme
seeking specifically to respond to differences in labor regulation throughout North America”

(1994). Additionally, there are two mandatory structures (“The North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation”). These structures are the Commission for Labor Cooperation, which is
made up of a Ministerial Council and a Secretariat, and National Administrative Offices (NAOs)
in each member county: the structure allows for oversight and enforcement if a member country
is noncompliant with the rules of the NAALC (“The North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation”). As stated by the United States Department of Labor:
The Agreement creates both international and domestic institutions. The international
institution is the Commission for Labor Cooperation, consisting of a Council supported
by a Secretariat. The domestic institutions are the National Administrative Offices
(NAOs), located in each of the countries, and national or governmental advisory
committees (“The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”)
The first of these components is the “cabinet- level Ministerial Council and a permanent
staff Secretariat [which] make up the Commission for Labor Cooperation” (Compa 7). The
Council is made up of the United States Secretary of Labor, the Mexican Secretary of Labor and
the Canadian Minister of Labor (Compa 7). The purpose of the Council is to ensure the
compliance of the NAALC and work as a single entity to ensure the enforcement of the NAALC
(Compa 7).
Additionally, the Council oversees the independent Secretariat, whom has an office
located in Dallas, Texas and has a small staff of fifteen members (Compa 7). The two main
functions of the Secretariat are creating reports on the labor laws and labor markets of the three
countries and acting as a “general administrative arm” “providing staff support to the Council
and to any Evaluation Committees of Experts or Arbitral Panels established under the
Agreement” (Compa 9).

The other mandatory structure the NAALC provides is the National Administrative
Offices (NAOs) within each member country’s Labor Department (Compa 9). The basic function
of the NAO offices is to “serve as a points of contact and sources information among themselves
and government agencies, with the Dallas-based Secretariat, and with the public” (Compa 9).
Furthermore, the NAOs are the bodies that receive labor complaints that occur in fellow NAFTA
countries (Compa 9).
Workers, unions and allies of these groups who have complaints must file these
complaints with the NAO in any country other then their own in order to begin the review
process of their case (Compa 10). If there is a case that involves one or more of the eleven
standards that have been agreed to by each country then the NAO may recommend “ministerial
consultations at the Council level as part of its ‘report for review’…. The consultations can be
bi-lateral… or tri-lateral” (Compa 10).
After consultations occur (if they occur at all), any Party, meaning member country,
involved in the dispute is allowed to request the establishment an independent Evaluation
Committee of Experts (ECE). This may be requested if any of the labor principles are involved,
with the exception of principles 1, 2 or 3 (Compa 10). Although an ECE can be established due
to a complaint, a minister is able to request an ECE without any such formal complaint being
present.
If a Party requested an ECE report and after the report has been commissioned said Party
is still not satisfied then they are able to request an independent Arbitral Panel (Compa 10-11).
This panel has the authority to rule on the issue and offer an “action plan” to the parties in
conflict (Compa 10). If the action plan is not implemented then the Arbitral Panel has the
authority to “impose a monetary enforcement assessment against the offending government”

(Compa 11). If the fine is not paid by the offending government then there is the potential for
trade sanctions to be applied to the incompliant country” (Compa 11).
Overall, the structure provides for a “four-level dispute resolution process to promote
compliance with national labor law” (Caulfield 66). The dispute process consists of: “(1) NAO
review and consultations, (2) ministerial consultations, (3) evaluation by a committee of experts,
and (4) review by a dispute-resolution panel” formally called an Arbitral Panel (Caulfield 66).
However, of the thirty-nine cases that have ever been brought to the NAO’s for review none
have ever made it past the ministerial consultation phase (“Submissions under the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”).
Now that I have explained the framework of the NAALC and the structure for
implementing and overseeing the rules laid out in the NAALC, it should be clear that getting
cases reviewed is a tedious and arduous process with no guarantee of any remedy. However, if
we accept that the reason for creating the NAALC was to improve labor standards and create a
path to reconcile any grievances, then we can not just look at the structures laid out in the text of
the agreement: we must also decide how effective these structures have been in providing the
services that they said they would and if the member countries and corporations are actually
being held to the standards laid out in the agreement.
In the next section of the paper, I will be reviewing literature on the topic of the NAALC
to further expand on my research.
Literature Review
In this section, I will provide additional academic sources that have focused on the
effectiveness and reality of the NAALC.

A handful of studies looking into the NAALC have shown that Mexico’s domestic labor
standards are not being complied with under the NAALC (Englehart 386). For example, a report
conducted by the Human Rights Watch that aimed to evaluate the accord and gauge how
compliant the countries have been in respect to the NAALC, found many structural problems
that the member countries have refused to resolve (“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights
Cases”). The report states, “little has been done… to overcome structural problems found in [the]
enforcement mechanisms [of the NAALC]” (“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”). The
report also notes, “although the side agreement does not require outside complaints to spur
governmental action on non-compliance with NAALC obligations, to date no country has
independently initiated consultations regarding possible violations of the NAALC” (“The Results
of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”). The fact that no country has pursued any type of investigation
implies a lack of will power by the Party countries to adhere to the standards of the NAALC
(“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”). Moreover, the NAOs have openly admitted that
there are structural problems within the NAALC because they have held training and seminars to
discuss the structural weaknesses (“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”). However,
these trainings and seminars have not created any changes to the enforcement mechanism
processes in which many submitters have taken issue with and believe that the poor structuring
of the NAALC has resulted in unfair results in the cases that have been filed (“The Results of
NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”).
It is interesting that there has been so many complaints about the Mexican government’s
non-compliance when, on paper, Mexican labor laws are quite strong (McGuinness 16). In fact,
Article 123 of the Mexican constitution creates rigid standards in which employers are supposed
to abide by (McGuinness 6). For examples, some of the fundamental labor standards included in

the Constitution are “standards controlling the work day, [standards regulating] working
conditions and the Mexican laborer’s right to organize” (McGuiness 6-7). While the standards
may seem strong, unfortunately, they continue to go unenforced (McGuinness 16-18)
A reason for the lack of enforcement may be due to a theory called Social Dumping
(McGuinness 1) In the article, “The Politics of Labor Regulation in North America: A
Reconsideration of Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico,” Michael McGuiness introduces the
theory of Social Dumping and explains the ramifications of the phenomenon. First, the theory is
rooted in three major arguments: First, that Mexico’s labor structure is disorganized and hence
the workforce suffers from this disorganization, second, due to weak regulations in Mexico, the
United States and Canada will take advantage of the poorly regulated Mexican workforce and
third, the Mexican workforce will be exploited in terms of workplace safety and health
conditions due to US and Canadian corporate interests (McGuinness 4; Alexander and Labotz;
Kay 429). He attributes these three reasons to why the Mexican government continues to poorly
enforce their own laws (McGuinness 4).
Furthermore, in the article, authored in 1996, titled, “Downward Mobility Mexican
Workers After NAFTA,” author Carlos Heredia expresses his distaste with NAFTA. He
expresses the sentiment that NAFTA was “designed to facilitate investment and capital flows
into the regions, and to maintain a pool of cheap and available labor” (Heredia). The “cheap and
available labor” has led to continuous complaints against the Mexican government, but often
times, the complaints go unresolved (“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”; Heredia).
Moreover, he states, “in both countries [the United States and Mexico], only big capitalists have
benefited from NAFTA (Heredia). While he remains adamant that the working conditions in
Mexico are not up to standard, he does believe that three things could help fix the unfavorable

conditions. The three things are: democratization of labor unions, political alliances between
unions and other organized sectors of the population and leadership that looks beyond
geographical borders” (Heredia).
While it seems heavily agreed upon that there are not enough stringent enforcement
mechanisms to adequately protect Mexican laborers, there are some ways in which the NAALC
has tried to establish standards to hold countries and corporations accountable. The Agreement
established the National Administrative Office within each of the member country’s labor
department. Additionally, the Agreement created the North American Commission for Labor
Standards, which is “headed by a Ministerial Counsel comprised of the three parties’ labor
secretaries to coordinate the implementation of the agreement (Jacobs 130). However, even with
these mechanisms to help regulate abuses, there are still widespread problems and flaws that
need to be worked out in order to successfully achieve the objectives of the NAALC (Jacobs
2010). One of the main reasons for all the problems, in regards to the structures created by the
NAALC, is that there are ever hardly any cases that go to the NAO. In the first twelve years of
NAFTA, only thirty-four complaints were ever filed and of the complaints, none have made it
past the consultation phase (Jacobs 131-132). Jacobs seems to believe that the reason for the lack
of prosecution is due to the Ministers’ unwillingness to pursue arbitration (Jacobs 136). Overall,
there seems to be many studies and observations that prove there are fundamental flaws in the
NAALC.
With this analysis we must question why ministers are unwilling to enforce labor
standards and what would push ministers to decide they will begin enforcing standards. Further,
we must evaluate what the NAALC is doing and if what it is currently doing is effective in

protecting laborers. In the next section of this paper, I will explain the reality of the NAALC and
delve deeper into why this accord has been deemed as ineffective.
The Reality: Why the NAALC is Not Effective
In this section, I will explain how structural weakness of the NAALC and how the efforts
to enforce the NAALC are inadequate.
Structural Weakness
A) Enforcement Mechanisms
As stated previously, the NAALC does not establish any new labor standards for the
member countries to comply with (Compa 7). Its’ most fundamental goal is to have member
countries, the United Stated, Canada and Mexico, comply with their own domestic labor
standards (Compa 7). Author, Frederick Englehart, perfectly explains what the purpose of the
NAALC is in a piece he published titled, "Withered Giants: Mexican And U.S. Organized Labor
And The North American Agreement On Labor." Englehart explains:
Oversight mechanisms [drafted in the NAALC] are aimed at enhancing the public’s
understanding of labor law and transparency or enforcement rather than punishment
through trade sanctions. Sanctions exist, but are contemplated to be applied only upon the
failure of cooperation and consultation, expert evaluation, negotiation, and arbitration
(351)
This leads to the conclusion that the different oversight bodies were structured more for the
public image of the NAALC, as opposed to a body that could actually directly impact labor law
and protect workers.
While transparency is beneficial to creating success in championing fair labor practices,
due to the nature of the NAALC, many critics are upset by the totality of the agreement. In his

work, “The Limits of Regionalism: NAFTA’s Labour Accord,” Robert Finbow explains how
skeptics of the NAALC continue to feel about the accord. He states, “critics were generally
dismissive of the NAALC’s potential, and viewed it cynically as a paper tiger designed to
assuage political pressures rather than encourage effective enforcement of labour laws and
rights” (Finbow 4). Most critics agree that“ the labour accord is a weak vehicle designed ‘to
publicly denounce the violation of labor laws [and] to sensitize public opinion regarding these
violations and their impact’, with insufficient enforcement power” (Finbow 4).
The insufficient enforcement power is most obviously seen in the fact that a state can
only face sanctions, the most severe repercussion for breaking the accord, for violating labor
principles 5, 6 and 9. (Bieszczat 1393) “The glaring omission is the failure to provide sanctions
for violations of the right to organize and bargain collectively” (Bieszczat 1393-1394). Out of the
eleven labor principles that were agreed upon by each of the member countries only three hold
any significant power. It must be noted that sanctions have thus far never been used in any of the
thirty-nine cases that have gone to the NAOs for review (“Submissions under the NAALC”).
The most prominent enforcement mechanism used so far has been ministerial
consultations (Bieszczat 1394). However, not much is ever accomplished by these ministerial
consultations and there is never a direct remedy for the workers who had their rights violated in
accordance with the labor principles that were agreed upon in the NAALC (Bieszczat 1394).
Typically, after wrongdoing is found the Council will, more likely than not, create training
sessions for government officials or establish a new type of committee (Bieszczat 1394). “This
result leads to petitioner frustration, as even a successful petition accomplishes nothing more
than what is perceived as a public relations move by the party governments” (Bieszczat 1394).

Figure 1: Data used from the United States Department of Labor
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Since workers realize that filing a petition has not ever led to a clear remedy for them and “given
the resources necessary to achieve this toothless result, petitioners are disincentivized from
utilizing the NAALC petition process” (Bieszczat 1394). This may explain why only thirty-nine
cases have ever been submitted for review.
The reality of the NAALC is that it has no real power to remedy workers. Workers, now
seeing what has occurred when submitting a successful petition, feel disenfranchised because
they know the NAALC process will not help them in their fight for justice (Bieszczat 1349).
Furthermore, of the thirty-nine cases that have been submitted, only twenty-two have been
accepted for review and of those twenty-two cases the NAOs only recommended ministerial
consultations in fourteen of those cases: refer to figure 1 for a breakdown of the cases. This is
troubling information given that the main objective of the NAALC, bettering working conditions
in North America, is not being met for workers in Mexico.
This analysis leads to the argument that the structures set up under the NAALC do not
have any real enforcement mechanism (Jacobs 139-140). As author Cody Jacobs states in his
article “Trade We Can Believe In: Renegotiating NAFTA's Labor Provisions To Create More

Equitable Growth In North America,” “the highest level of enforcement available under the
NAALC [are] ministerial consultations” and even when these consultations have found
wrongdoing on the part of corporations “none of the wrongly fired laborers were compensated or
reinstated and none of the companies faced any consequences” (Jacobs 136). These early cases
quickly reinforced the image of the NAALC among labor unions and activists as ‘more of a
meeting place than a true enforcement mechanism’” (Jacobs 136).
It would seem then that since there was open discussion about the wrongdoings that were
being committed in violation of the NAALC, member countries would want to see repercussion
for the incompliance. However, this is not the case. Instead, it was openly acknowledged that the
NAALC was not creating legitimate enforcements, but member countries were okay with this
fact: “the Clinton administration argued that [the] NAALC strengthened awareness of core
rights” (Finbow 88). The “awareness,” however, never seemed to translate into any feasible
action. The lack of any “concrete results” has led an overwhelming amount of negative criticism
and has made the majority opinion of the NAALC remarkably negative (Bieszczat 1393).
B) Non-interference by Other Countries
Finally, to make it clear that there will be no labor interference amongst the other
member countries, no matter what the issue, Article 52 Part Six was agreed upon and is written
in the NAALC. Part Six under Article 52 of the NAALC it states “Nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to empower a Party's authorities to undertake labor law enforcement activities
in the territory of another Party” (Government of Canada 2013). Essentially, Article 52 makes it
evident that no member country can, in any way, act on behalf of another country in an effort to
ensure labor standards are enforced in another country’s territory.

This part of the agreement was most likely written in the manner it was due to Mexico’s
strong stance on enforcing their labor laws without interference (or repercussion) from other
countries (Guerra Torriente 503-504). Before the NAALC negotiations even started, Mexico was
adamant about ensuring autonomy and sovereignty in its’ territory when entering an agreement
with the US and Canada (Guerra and Torriente 504).
During the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico opposed the notion of permitting the NAALC
Commission to intervene into the area of Mexico’s enforcement of its own labor laws,
particularly those laws regulating collective bargaining. Mexico argued that such
intervention could result in interference with and violation of Mexico’s territorial
sovereignty. Mexico took the position that permitting such interference was inappropriate
in the context of a commercial treaty. The U.S. Nevertheless insisted that the NAALC be
drafted (Guerra and Torriente 504)
Knowing that the Mexican government had strong views on overseeing their labor law, it is a
wonder why the U.S and Canada went forward with the NAALC. Especially, when the U.S.
always was open with the fact that the Mexican government was not good at enforcing their
domestic labor laws (Guerra and Torriente 504). It is evident that critics are right in saying, “the
NAALC… is… little more than a statement of good intentions [and] suffers from lack of clarity
and lack of an efficient mechanism for achieving its goals, with the enforcement of most of its
provisions left to the discretion of each of the NAFTA parties” (Guerra and Torriente 504).
To conclude the section, I want to emphasize that I understand the importance of
protecting a country’s sovereignty. However, human rights abuses, especially in the context of
NAFTA, should be subject to scrutiny on an international level. While it is important to ensure
that each country is able to be autonomous and act in a way that best serves their population, we

must remember that NAFTA is an international trade agreement and the NAALC is a means to
ensure labor standards across the member countries. The structural weakness of the NAALC has
rendered it ineffective and completely incapable of achieving it’s mission of enhancing labor
standards across North America.
Monitoring Labor Standards
Monitoring labor standards is a critical aspect to enforcing labor law. Without any sort of
enforcement mechanism, laborers are unable to voice complaints and abuses continue to persist.
Mexico’s case, however, is quite interesting. “On paper, Mexican workers’ rights appear
enviable…. ‘Mexican people live and work under and astounding collection of protective labor
statutes, policies and practices which provide them, as employees, with an extensive list of
detailed rights and privileges’” (Finbow 55). In fact, the Mexican Constitution, in Article 123,
“establishes a number of fundamental labor standards in order to ensure dignified work for
Mexican laborers, including standards controlling the work day, working conditions and the
Mexican laborer’s right to organize” (McGuinness 6-7). While the paper trail looks good for
Mexico and their laborers, the reality is much different.
There is an excess of incompliance and loopholes that allow Mexican labor standards to
fall short in comparison with the United States and Canada. One study, which was conducted
from the Human Rights Watch, points out that labor inspectors simply seem unwilling to
investigate claims of labor discrimination (in this case specifically, claims of gender
discrimination) or they lack knowledge to conduct an effective investigation (McGuinness 1718). Others who have investigated the issue have attributed it to the corruption and
disorganization within the inspection system (McGuinness 19). Further, there are accounts that
simply place the blame on the lack of political will amongst the labor administrator’s in Mexico:

they do not effectively enforce or regulate compliance with the country’s labor standards
(McGuinness 2014). Lastly, there is some consensus that Mexico has adopted a “hands off
approach to labor law enforcement…. [because] the Mexican government is more interested in
attracting and appeasing foreign investors than in aggressively protecting the rights of Mexican
Workers” (McGuinness 18).
Due to the lack of resources and lack of will on the part of the Mexican government,
labor standards continue to go unenforced. It was thought that the NAALC’s dispute-resolution
process would remedy the lack of compliance with domestic labor standards in Mexico, but it
has been discovered by multiple researchers that this is not the case. Instead, noncompliance
continues to go unpunished and workers face grave injustice. Now that I have explained the
structural weakness of the NAALC and the problematic nature of labor standards being
monitored, I will now move on to the data and methods I use for the purposes of my research.
Data and Methods
In this section of the paper, I will explain the data and methods I have chosen to use in
order to assess and analyze the topic.
I have approached this topic by using the case study method. I have chosen two cases,
USNAO 19004 and USNAO 2000-02, in order to prove my thesis statement: the NAALC has
not adequately protected laborers in Mexico. While there are thirty-nine different cases to look at
regarding NAALC submissions, the two cases I chose adequately represents the common trend
amongst all the cases. These two cases reflect the broader pattern that cases, which go through
the dispute-resolution process of the NAALC, do not result in substantive resolution for laborers
in Mexico. Nor do they create compliance with labor provisions by the Mexican government.

The case study method was the most appropriate choice for this paper because it allows
me to demonstrate, clearly, all the details that go into deciding a case and then look at the remedy
provided by either the NAOs or the Council. I can evaluate how the NAOs decide to evaluate a
case, whether their evaluation is just and if the remedy provided is substantive and adheres to the
main objective of the NAALC- to create better working conditions across all of North America.
In the next section of this paper, I will describe, in depth, two cases that have gone
through the NAALC dispute-resolution process.
Case Studies
In this section of the paper, I will look at two separate case studies in order to
demonstrate the lack of remedy provided by the NAALC.
General Background on Cases
The National Administrative Office’s are generally in charge of providing remedies for cases
involving labor standard violations (McGuinness 584). It is through the NAO’s that laborers who
believe they have legitimate claims can seek redress and file their complaints. The NAO’s, on
paper, are supposed to be protecting laborers by ensuring member countries are monitoring and
complying with labor standards throughout their country. However, when looking at the way in
which NAO’s have dealt with claims, it seems that there has been no real remedies for laborers
who have filed claims (Jacobs 136).
I have derived this assertion through a multitude of sources. To start, in the article "Trade We
Can Believe In: Renegotiating NAFTA's Labor Provisions To Create More Equitable Growth In
North America," author Cody Jacobs states “in the first 12 years of NAFTA’s existence, only 34
complaints were ever filed with the NAO. Of those complaints, none have ever gone past the
consultation phase and the majority were either dismissed or withdrawn at the national level”

(Jacobs 136). At first reading, it may seem that these complaints were simply remedied at the
ministerial consultation level, but as Jacobs further explains, “labor ministers’ reluctance
[emphasis mine] to pursue arbitration (or even convene an ECE), is a reflection of their role as
political appointees and representatives of their governments, rather than as impartial enforcers
of the agreement” (Jacobs 136). This leads Jacobs to the ultimate claim that “[w]ith the dispute
resolution process of the NAALC largely ineffective, Mexican authorities continue to laxly
enforce their own labor laws, particularly in the area of free association, to the direct detriment of
Mexican workers and the indirect detriment of U.S and Canadian workers facing unfair
competition (136). The unfair nature of enforcement from the NAO’s and the Mexican
government has made it difficult for Mexican workers to actually voice complaints.
USNAO 94001- Honeywell Corporations
Honeywell Manufacturas de Chihuahua, S.A is a manufacturing plant that specializes in
producing electronics equipment in the city Chihuahua, Mexico (USNAO Submission #94001
and #94002 2). At the time of the allegations, the plant employed approximately 480 workers
(NAO Submission #94001 and #94002 2). The NAO accepted the case for review on April 15,
1994 (United States Department of Labor).
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) filed a case against Honeywell
Corporation through the U.S. NAO. The allegations of the case were that Honeywell was not
allowing workers to join unions of their choice and, consequently, firing and threatening workers
who showed interest in unionizing (Caulfield 72; Compa 14). Workers at Honeywell were paid,
what is equivalent to, forty-five U.S. dollars a week. IBT asserted that these wages were
“exceptionally low” and in order for the corporation to keep them this low “Honeywell ha[d]
used illegal threats and firings to keep its employees from joining a union” (NAO Submission

#94001 and #94002 2-3). The allegers stated that the Mexican government was in violation of
labor principle 1 of the NAALC and, additionally, was in violation of Article 123 of the Mexican
Constitution; they did not adequately protect Mexican workers right to organize (Compa 14).
The specifics of the case are that on November 12, 1993, an officer of the union Sindicato
de Trabajadores de la Industría Metálica, Acero, Hierro, Conexos y Similares (STIMAHCS),
which is part of an independent labor organization, Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), hosted a
meeting that twelve Honeywell workers attended (NAO Submission #94001 and #94002 3).
After this meeting, in late November, Honeywell “fired approximately 20 production workers,
nearly all of whom expressed an interest in joining an independent union” (USNAO Submission
#94001 and #94002 3). Furthermore, the allegers state that the workers who were being fired
were told that their termination was a result of their union interests and that they had to sign
resignation forms in order to receive their severance (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002
3). Additionally, the submission details that one of the workers who was fired by Honeywell
filed a complaint before a Mexican Conciliation and Arbitration Board (CAB), which was
pending, during the time the submission to the U.S. NAO (USNAO Submission #94001 and
#94002 3). It should be noted that, “CABs have a reputation for refusing to reinstate workers
fired for supporting independent unions like the FAT” (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002
3).
The US NAO accepted the case for review and held a public hearing to review the facts
of the case on September 12, 1994 (Compa 14). Workers from the plant, Mexican labor lawyers
and US union representatives testified, however, no one representing the Honeywell Corporation
came to give a statement (Compa 14). Lawyers who were representing the submitters asked for

several recommendations (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 19). These
recommendations included:
[R]equiring the two companies involved [Honeywell and General Electric] in the
submission to reinstate workers, … asking companies to adhere to a code of conduct on
worker rights for their operation in the maquiladora sector…. And recommended
sustained consultations among the NAOs to develop cooperative activities on
associational and organizing rights (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 19)
After the testimony was given, the Pubic Report of Review was issued on October 12,
1994 (United States Department of Labor). The final consensus of the NAO was that they were
“not in a position to make a finding that the government of Mexico failed to enforce the relevant
labor laws” (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 30). The reason for this decision was
because the Mexican workers that were fired took a severance package, henceforth, “preempting
Mexican authorities from establishing whether the dismissals were for cause or in retribution for
union organizing” (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 30). However, the NAO
acknowledges that most workers face economic hardship and therefore had to take the severance
deal as opposed to getting their case reviewed by the Mexican Conciliation and Arbitration
Board (CAB): “since workers for personal financial reasons accepted severance” they could not
hold the Mexican government accountable for not taking action (USNAO Submission #94001
and #94002 29-30).
It seems counterintuitive then to assert that most worked had to take the severance
package due to the economic hardship they faced, yet still render a decisions that would not
provide remedy to workers who face these situations. It should also be noted that the NAO stated
the purpose of the review “had not been aimed primarily at whether or not the two companies

named in submission acted in violation of Mexican labor law” (USNAO Submission #94001 and
#94002 19). The point of the NAALC is to ensure each government in complying with their
domestic laws, but one of the main objectives is to better working standards across North
America- in this case, it seems these two ideals conflicted.
While the NAO chose not to hold a ministerial consultation, which could have led to
finding the government responsible for the firings, the NAO did state that it “shares the
submitters’ concerns about the vital importance of freedom of association and right to organize
and the implications for workers of the failures of the governments to protect such rights”
(USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 32). Due to the NAO’s concerns they ultimately
recommended several “cooperative activities” on the “issues of freedom of association and the
right to organize”; these cooperative activities should include public education programs
regarding the NAAALC (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 32-33). The member
countries agreed to the recommendation and in 1996 held a conference in Canada where they
discussed the issues of freedom of association, the right to organize and employment structures
(Compa 15).
While the process of the NAOs aims to achieve the objective of “improving labor
standards across North America,” it is important to remember that the NAOs only look at
government enforcement and not how corporations are treating employees (“The North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation). The NAO asserts this fact in their Report of
Review by saying:
[T]he NAO review has not been aimed primarily at determining whether or not the two
companies named in the submissions may be in violation of Mexican labor law.
Moreover, the NAO is not an appellate body nor is it a substitute for pursuing domestic

remedies. Rather, the purpose of the NAO review process, including the public hearing,
is to gather as much information as possible to allow the NAO to better understand and
publicly report on the Government of Mexico’s promotion of compliance with, and
effective enforcement of, its labor law through appropriate government action, as set out
in Article 3 of the NAALC (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 28)
The NAO essentially found that workers had had their rights violated, however, due to the nature
of the NAALC there was no way to hold the corporation accountable for these violations.
USNAO 2000-01- Auto Trim and Custom Trim
Auto Trim of Matamoros, Tamaulipas and Custom Breed of Valle Hermoso, Tamaulipas
are maquiladora plants that specialize in manufacturing steering wheels and gearshifts (USNAO
Submission #2000-01 9). The submission was filed by the Coalition for Justice in the
Maquiladoras, twenty-two other unions and nongovernmental organization and several workers
from Auto Trim and Custom Trim (“Submissions under the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation”). The submission was filed on July 3, 2000 and the US NAO published a
Public Report of Review issued on April 6, 2001 (“Submissions under the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). In the NAOs report, ministerial-level consultations were
recommended (“Submissions under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”).
The allegations of the case were that workers in these two plants had health and safety
concerns due to exposure to toxic substances and muscular-skeletal disorders caused by
“ergonomically unsound practices” (USNAO Submission #2000-01 9). Additionally, workers
urged that problems stemmed from:
[F]ailure to provide information and training about occupational hazards, pressure on
workers to meet excessively high production quotas, poorly designed work stations,

inadequate personal protective equipment, lack of properly functioning safety and health
committees, failure to stock medical supplies on-site, failure to institute workplace
monitoring, and substandard ventilation. The submitters also maintain that occupational
illnesses and injuries are often unreported or under-reported and that workers are
inadequately treated and compensated (USNAO Submission #2000-01 9)
The multitude of problems that went unresolved led to the submission of the case to the NAALC
in order for workers to remedy the problems that occurred at these two plants.
Moreover, the submitters insist that these violations that had been occurring were due to
the “inadequate enforcement on the part of the Mexican government, namely the failure to
conduct inspections and impose sanctions or fines” (USNAO Submission #2000-01 9). The
workers detail that they filed multiple submissions to the Mexican government (before filing the
NAALC submission) in order to remedy the violations occurring at their place of work (USNAO
Submission #2000-01 9-10). For example, In April 1999 workers, who had already filed for a
petition to the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) but did not receive any help, filed
another submission to the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) and the Secretariat of Health
(SSA) to conduct inspections. However, the workers never believed any such inspection took
place even though the SSA, after further insistence from the workers, told them they would
conduct inspections (USNAO Submission #2000-01 5).
Due to the continued lack of enforcement by the government, the submitters argued that
the government of Mexico violated the NAALC: specifically, provisions in articles 1, 3, 4, 5 and
7 (USNAO Submission #2000-01 10). Additionally, the government failed to enforce the
Mexican Constitution and various national laws, standards and regulations (USNAO Submission

#2000-01 10). Due to the nature of the violations, the submitters of the petition asked for several
remedies.
The submitters requested several actions from the US NAO. The key actions they
requested were: investigating and examining the health violations that were occurring at Auto
Trim and Custom Trim, compelling the Mexican government to comply with the health and
safety standards that are established the Mexican constitution and established laws and to
determine the “required fines and penalties for each health and safety violation at Auto Trim and
Custom Trim/ Breed Mexicana according to the conclusions of the fact-finding commission”
(USNAO Submission #2000-01 10).
The NAO did investigate the complaints and issue the findings of their inspection in their
Public Report of Review. The US NAO found that the government has taken “remedial
measures” to conduct health and safety reviews (USNAO Submission #2000-01 55). However,
while the US NAO made the assertion that the Mexican government did complete inspections to
varying degrees, they also found that “the efficacy of these processes [was] problematic”
(USNAO Submission #2000-01 55). The problematic nature of the Mexican government’s
inspections can be seen in three key areas. The first is that the inspection reports give personal
details about workers (USNAO Submission #2000-01 55). The lack of confidentiality in the
reports likely led to workers not feeling secure in voicing the real problems they were having at
their workplace in fear of facing repercussions from their company (USNAO Submission #200001 55). Second, the inspectors used a checklist when conducting their report. So, instead of
testing and ensuring compliance with what was on the list, they only noted the existence of
workplace systems and documents (USNAO Submission #2000-01 55). This led inspectors to
carelessly give inspections and made it highly likely for inspectors to not look into violations that

were occurring at these two plants. Lastly, “the procedures for certifying third party monitors,
which are relied on by employers and the governmental authorities [were] not clear” (USNAO
Submission #2000-01 55). With procedures not being clear, there were likely many discrepancies
in the ways in which the different inspectors were conducting their inspections.
Overall, the USNAO stated that they were recommending this case for ministerial
consultation because the Mexican government failed to communicate with workers about the
efforts the government was making in response to petitions that workers had previously filed and
the lack of record keeping on the part of the government documenting the efforts the government
was, supposedly, making (USNAO Submission #2000-01 55). Additionally, the US NAO asked
the petitioners to draft a set of recommendations for the Ministerial Council to look over
(Shurtman 326). The highest prioritized recommendations on the submitters list were the
demands for the IMSS and STPS (Shurtman 327-328). They asked the IMSS to re-evaluate the
cases of workers who were denied unemployment-related compensation pay or who claimed to
be under-paid by the company (Shurtman 327). Furthermore they wanted the IMSS to “establish
public, transparent criteria” for evaluations done by medical doctor on workers who claim they
were injured or fell ill due the workplace, award compensation to these workers and ensure that
workers who were being evaluated by the IMSS be given written notice of why the IMSS
decided to award or deny compensation (Shurtman 327). They also recommended STPS
(Secretary of Labor and Social Security) re-inspect the plant, continue monitoring on a regular
schedule, issue the corrective measure to the employer and impose sanctions if the violations
persist at the plants (Shurtman 328). They also stated in the closing of their letter, “the U.S. and
Mexican governments must establish a reasonable timetable for the conduct of ministerial
consultations and implementation of the submitters’ recommendations” (Shurtman 328-329).

Submitters had much trouble during the NAALC process getting information from the NAOs
and were left wondering when reviews would be held (Shurtman 326). The untimeliness of the
process led submitters to emphasize the NAALC resolution-dispute process needed to be
conducted in a more efficient manner so workers could be remedied as soon as possible (328).
On June 11, 2002 a Joint Ministerial Declaration was signed by the US and Mexican
Labor Secretaries (Shurtman 332). The Ministerial Declaration declared that the problems that
were raised in the submission would be resolved by establishing an “intergovernmental Working
Group to further study the issues” (Shurtman 332). Unfortunately, the Joint Declaration “neither
adopted any of the submitters’ proposals, nor referred to one of the workers’ primary concerns:
the failure of the IMSS to comply with its own laws, regulations, and norms regarding treatment
and compensation for work-related injuries and illness” (Shurtman 332).
The requests made by the submitters and the action taken by the Ministerial Council
clearly does not match. After five years of time and energy put into this case the remedy that was
given has achieved nothing for the workers: “ No evidence exists that their [the submitters]
efforts achieved measureable gains in the enforcement of occupational health and safety laws at
other maquiladoras” (Shurtman 338). The realization that nothing was gained for the workers
after going through the arduous NAALC resolution-dispute process has led to many frustrations
and concerns by experts and workers alike. As Garrett Brown, an occupational health and safety
expert and coordinator or the Maquiladora Health and Safety Support Network states:
If after dotting ever ‘i’ and crossing every ‘t’, these Mexican workers, who have
suffered serious health problems due to conditions at their plants, can’t get the
company or the Mexican and U.S. governments to correct the serious health and

safety hazards documented by the U.S. Labor Department and U.S. NIOSH
investigations, what does this mean for the enforcement of labor rights under
NAFTA (Shurtman 338)
The lack of remedy that comes from even “successful” cases may be the reason that in the past
twenty-three years, the total lifetime of the NAALC, only thirty-nine cases have been submitted.
However, even after the less than ideal remedy provided by the Ministerial Council, the
submitters of the original case have continued to “press for a more concrete resolution of the
case” (Shurtman 294).
The workers have expressed their distaste for the “intergovernmental Working Group”
that was created by calling the Joint Declaration “all talk and no action” (Finbow 127; Shurtman
294). The submitters have done far more than just voice complaints about the remedy given by
the Ministerial Council. Additionally, the workers have tried and communicate with the labor
ministers about their concerns and have made it known they would like to be apart of the remedy
process (Shurtman 294). For example, the workers recommended member countries “enhance
enforcement of existing occupational healthy and safety laws,” but the NAALC never responded
to their suggestion (Shurtman 294). Additionally, the workers and the NGOs that participated in
the petition asked the labor ministers if they could take part in the “intergovernmental
discussions” in respect to the Auto Trim case: this request was denied (Shurtman 294). Now that
I have detailed two cases, USNOA 94001 and USNAO 2000-01, I will explain my findings and
give recommendations on the matter.
Findings
In this section of the paper, I will explain the findings I discovered in the case studies in

which I detailed in the previous section.
After reviewing the two cases, USNAO 19004 and USNAO 2000-01, it seems that there
are several problems with the dispute resolution process that is set up in the NAALC. To start,
the NAALC determines whether or not it will review a case. If an NAO feels that the submission
filed would not “meet the objectives” of the NAALC than it will decline to review the case
(“Submissions under the NAALC”). However, if one of the main objectives of the NAALC is to
“encourage the improvement of labor standards across North America” than it naturally follows
that a submission alleging labor violations should at least have an investigation conducted and a
report issued by one of the NAOs (Caulfield 66).
Moreover, I found that even when the NAOs find wrongdoing or imply they have found
wrongdoing, they do not necessarily remedy the wrongdoing. For example, in both the
Honeywell and Auto Trim cases, the US NAO believed the submitters had legitimate claims and
violations had occurred (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 32; USNAO Submission
#2001-01 6). However, even though the NAALC acknowledged the violations, they did not do
anything to directly remedy the workers; even though in both cases workers asked for direct
remedies (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 33; USNAO Submission #2001-01 55). This
is most likely due to states unwillingness to enforce their labor law (Bieszczat 1404). Due to
their unwillingness to act it seems “nearly impossible that the NAALC’s goals will be achieved
through a process that relied upon state action” (Bieszczat 1404).
However, the most problematic finding in the cases were that even when a ministerial
consultation occurred, workers still are not remedied for the injustice that has occurred. Having
the NAO grant a ministerial consultation is thought to be a “success” in terms of the NAALC

dispute-resolution process. However, even when a case is “successful” this does not guarantee
workers involved in the case will receive any remedy. Without the NAALC’s ability to monitor
corporate practices, it seems that laws, regulations and standards will continue to be underenforced and in many cases simply unenforced.
Recommendations
In this section of the paper, I will provide three recommendations for strengthening the
NAALC.
Independent Oversight Body
Currently, the Ministerial Council, which ultimately ensures compliance with the
NAALC, is made up of the Mexican and US Secretary of Labor and the Canadian Minister of
Labor (Compa 9). This means that the head of labor for each government is monitoring how their
country’s government in complying with the NAALC. While it may seem fitting that the
Secretaries/ Minister of Labor would oversee the labor accord, there seems to be a reluctance to
actually enforce the agreement (Bieszczat 1403, Human Rights Watch 6)
The reason that many scholars believe the NAALC is being ill enforced is due to the
politicization of the job (Jacobs 139; Bieszczat 1403, Human Rights Watch 6). What this means
is that government compliance is being ensured by a body of government workers. This leads to
a lack of political will, because political appointees do not want to make their country appear
incompliant, negligent or cruel (Jacobs 139). This can most obviously be seen in the reasoning
behind never calling for an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) to occur: if the case stops at
ministerial consultations then no expert (outsider) input can testify to the wrongdoings of the
government (Jacobs 139).

The nature of the job is to enforce the NAALC and to adhere to the mission of creating
better labor standards across North America. Therefore, a more isolated, apolitical body would
be better able to enforce the agreement (Jacobs 139). “As researcher Cody Jacobs states in his
article, "Trade We Can Believe In: Renegotiating NAFTA's Labor Provisions To Create More
Equitable Growth In North America," “a permanent supranational body that is more isolated
from political and diplomatic concerns would be able to provide a much more neutral arbiter of
the agreement as well as a source of consistent interpretations of the agreement that diplomatic
negotiations simply cannot provide” (140). An independent body would be able to fully focus
about on mission of the NAALC and would be less likely to get tied up in the political issues
taking place in the member countries (Human Rights Watch 2).
Penalizing Corporations
The NAALC, currently, only provides language that holds governments responsible for
lack of compliance with labor law. As stated in the Honeywell case, “the NAO review has not
been aimed primarily at whether or not the two companies named in submission acted in
violation of Mexican labor law” (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 28). This method
proves to be problematic because when Mexican workers get terminated, but need money due to
economic hardships, they feel pressed to take a severance package; like what was seen in the
Honeywell case (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 29). Under Mexican law once a
severance package is taken then the worker waives their right to file a claim against their former
employer (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 3).
The Honeywell case demonstrates how legal loopholes allow abuses to continue. The
NAALC only ensures the government is complying with the NAALC and if employees who are
wrongfully terminated continue taking severance then the Mexican government, under the

current provisions in the NAALC, the employer can not be held responsible. This system seems
convenient for the Mexican government and the corporations that have manufacturing plants in
Mexico. However, I believe the process should not be so easily manipulated.
One of the main objectives of the NAALC is to “improve workings and living standards
in each Party’s territory” (“North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). This goal is
currently not being met and will never be met if legal loopholes allow for abuses to continue
occur. Therefore, it seems that the best way to remedy the problem is to add provisions to the
agreement that would create a means to ensure corporations were complying with the NAALC.
If corporations were held accountable for the abuses that occur under their watch,
government officials may feel more compelled to participate in the dispute-resolution process
and corporations may begin to worry about workplace violations due to potential penalties.
I understand that by including provisions regarding compliance by corporations, the
agreement would take on a new meaning/function because the current agreement solely aims to
insure government compliance with domestic law. However, after much review of the cases that
have gone before the NAOs, I believe the easiest way to ensure workers are being treated fairly
is to monitor the actions of their employer. Theoretically, this could also increase cooperation by
the governments when complaints are made to the NAOs because the burden to uphold labor
standards would not solely be placed on the government.
Conclusion
In this section of the paper, I will state my final conclusion.
The NAALC has been in effect for twenty-three years, yet only thirty-nine submissions
have ever been made to the NAOs. Furthermore, of those thirty-nine submissions, the farthest
any of those have gone in the dispute-resolution process is to ministerial-consultations.

Therefore, we are able to speculate that there has been/ is reluctance by the Ministerial Council,
made up of the Mexican and United States Secretary of Labor and Canadian Minister of Labor,
to pursue further examinations of the cases. The lack of political will to fully investigate cases
and, more importantly, formulate tangible remedies for workers has rendered the NAALC
useless for workers who submit complaints.
As noted in the Case Study and Findings section of the paper, the cases that make it to
ministerial consultations are considered “successful,” yet individual workers are not ever
provided substantial remedies. The lack of enforcement power by the NAALC and the
unwillingness to provide remedies has created doubts in the minds of the workers. These doubts
that have been created due to the less than ideal solutions created by the Ministerial Council is
most likely the primary reason only thirty-nine complaints have ever been submitted to the
NAALC.
The ineffectiveness of the NAALC, which I have proven throughout the entirely of this
paper, has made me conclude changes to the structure and function of the NAALC need to occur
in order to ensure the NAALC upholds the main objectives of the agreement: the objectives are:
improving working conditions in North America; promoting a set of eleven labor principles;
encouraging cooperation to increase productivity and quality; encouraging information
exchanges to understand the labor laws in each country; pursing cooperative labor-related
activities; enforcing domestic labor law; and fostering transparency in the administration of labor
law (“North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). Since these objectives are not being
met, I recommend two changes that would help with enforcement and compliance with the
NAALC. First, create an independent oversight body to enforce the NAALC. Having
government officials perform this task has proven to be unsuccessful due to the conflicting

political aspects of the job. Second, create provisions in the text that would allow for the
NAALC to monitor corporations. If the NAALC could make findings about corporate behavior,
they could hold corporations accountable for their misdeeds and provide direct recommendations
or punishments to the corporations.
Overall, the lacking will power of the Council on Labor Cooperation to ensure that labor
standards are being complied with and workers are being remedied has created many doubts for
workers. The NAALC dispute-resolution process must be fixed in order to ensure fair labor
practices are occurring in Mexico, Canada and the United States. The NAALC has had twentythree years to enhance labor standards and ensure enforcement, but has failed. Due to the lack of
will power and continued non-compliance, the NAALC must be renegotiated in order to create
real change for workers in Mexico.
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